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1. Introduction 
 
According to Kaplan’s (1977) Fixity Thesis, the semantic value of indexicals, i.e. first and second person 
pronouns, is fixed by the context of the actual speech act and cannot be manipulated by any logical 
operator: I refers to the speaker and you to the addressee. This theory has been challenged by empirical 
facts, especially the ability of first and second person pronouns to be bound in English focus constructions 
and to shift their reference in attitude contexts in some other languages.  
The goal of this paper is to provide novel data from English that further refute the Fixity Thesis. 
Crucially, my new contribution is to show that there is an intrinsic grammatical dependency between the 
two context parameters speaker s and addressee a: first person pronouns can bind second person pronouns 
and vice versa. This is so, I argue, because I and you can be understood as descriptions (e-type pronouns), 
i.e. “your addressee” and “my addressee” respectively. 
 
2. Novel English data 
 
The argument is based on the availability of what I call “supersloppy readings” in VP-ellipsis and focus 
constructions as illustrated below in (1) and (3)-(5). 
 
1) a. (Romeo to Juliet) “I love you”.  
 b. (Juliet to Romeo) “I do too”. 
i. Juliet means: “I love you too”. [Juliet loves Romeo]                       (supersloppy reading) 
ii. Juliet means: “I love me/myself too”. [Juliet loves Juliet]                    (strict reading) 
 
(1) differs from regular cases of VP-ellipsis, which present sloppy and strict readings that are 
respectively derived from lambda-bound and referential representations of third person pronouns (a.o. Ross 
1967, Sag 1976, Williams 1977, Fiengo and May 1994) as shown in (2). The sloppy identity reading in (2)a 
obtains when the VP antecedent copied into the ellipsis site at LF contains a bound occurrence of the 
pronoun her; the strict identity reading in (2)b arises when that VP involves a free occurrence of her. 
 
2) a. Julie λi [VP loves heri mother]. Liz does λi [VP love heri mother], too. λx. x love x’s mother  (sloppy) 
 b. Julie [VP loves heri mother. Liz does [VP love heri mother], too.  λx. x love g(i)’s mother    (strict)     
 
(1)b does not exhibit a canonical sloppy reading like (2)a: the elided object pronoun cannot be bound 
by the subject pronoun I in (1)b just as her is bound by Liz in (2)a, because the corresponding pronouns you 
and I in the antecedent (1)a do not share the same person feature; the unavailability of a bound construal for 
you in (1)a makes sloppy identity impossible in (1)b given that sloppy identity is based on binding 
parallelism. Furthermore, the elided pronoun in (1)b is not referentially identical to the referent of the 
antecedent you (i.e. Juliet) under reading (1)b-i; this is only so under the strict reading in (1)b-ii similar to 
(2)b. But the reference of the elided pronoun in (1)b depends on that of the subject pronoun I under reading 
(1)b-i: it refers to the addressee of the speaker Juliet, namely Romeo, just like you in (1)a refers to the 
addressee of I, the speaker Romeo. It is for this reason that I dub reading (1)b-i “supersloppy”: the identity 
between the antecedent and the ellipsis site is not sloppy in relying on a standard bound variable 
interpretation of you, but supersloppy in relying on some other dependent interpretation of you with respect 
to I. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Many thanks to Gennaro Chierchia, Irene Heim, Dominique Sportiche and the audience of WCCFL33 for helpful 
comments and discussion. 
Conversely, supersloppy readings also obtain in VP-ellipsis cases if we reverse the pronouns I and you: 
an object first person pronoun can also depend on a subject second person pronoun so as to give rise to 
supersloppy identity as shown in (3). 
 
3) a. (Lucy to her mother)  “You don’t understand me”.  
 b. (Lucy’s mother to Lucy) “You don’t either”. 
i. “You don’t understand me either”. [Lucy does not understand her mother]       (supersloppy) 
ii. “You don’t understand yourself either”. [Lucy does not understand Lucy]                  (strict) 
 
Similarly, focus constructions1 can be interpreted in the same supersloppy way as illustrated in (4)-(5). 
 
4) (Tom to Sue, in a ballroom dancing class) “Only I make you swirl”. 
a. No other danceri makes hisi partner swirl.                                            (supersloppy) 
b. No other dancer makes Sue swirl.                                                   (strict) 
 
5) (Sue to Tom, in a ballroom dancing class) “Only you didn’t make me fall over”. 
a. All the other dancersi made theiri partner fall over.                                        (supersloppy) 
b. All the other dancers made Sue fall over.                                                 (strict) 
 
In readings (4)a and (5)a, the denotations of the object pronouns you and me respectively co-vary with 
the referent of their subject in the focus alternatives involving other salient pairs of dance partners. Again, 
this compares with the bound pronoun reading in (6)a involving a third person pronoun, even if I cannot 
standardly bind you (and vice versa) due to their different person features. 
 
6) a. Only Tomi λi [VP made hisi partner swirl]. (Nobody else made their partner swirl)    (sloppy) 
b. Only Tom [VP made hisi partner swirl]. (Nobody else made Tom’s partner swirl)         (strict)                                
 
Moreover, note that the supersloppy and the strict readings are indeed two different readings, i.e. 
neither entails the other: in particular, there can easily be situations in which (5)b is true but (5)a is false, 
and vice versa. 
 
3. Previous analyses 
 
Previous analyses of indexicals fail to predict the supersloppy readings in VP-ellipsis and focus 
constructions observed in Section 2: specifically, variable binding approaches undergenerate, and context-
shifting approaches overgenerate. This is so in all existing variants of the theories that are presented below. 
 
3.1 Variable binding approaches 
The most traditional analysis of indexicals (Kaplan 1977) treats them as constants: I refers to the speaker s, 
and you to the addressee a as represented in (7); in other words, indexicals simply refer to one of the 
coordinates of the context c. 
 
7) a. [[ me ]] c,w,g = sc 
 b. [[ you ]] c,w,g = ac 
 
This theory however wrongly predicts that first and second person pronouns can never have a bound 
interpretation contrary to fact: examples of bound first person pronouns are given in (8). For instance, the 
denotation of my under the bound pronoun (sloppy) reading in (8)b-i is not fixed, but co-varies with the 
subject. 
 
8) a. I am the only one around here who will admit that I could be wrong.                       (Partee 1989) 
b. Only I did my homework.                             (Heim 1991) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For space reasons, only focus constructions containing only will be illustrated in this paper. But a similar reasoning 
would hold for other focus constructions such as those involving even or also. 
 i. Nobody else did their homework.        (sloppy) 
 ii. Nobody else did my homework.          (strict) 
 
To account for these facts, it has been proposed that just like third person pronouns, first and second 
person pronouns denote variables that are interpreted via the assignment function g. Note that this view is 
furthermore attractive because all pronouns are thereby interpreted as variables uniformly, and person 
features are not assigned a specific status as compared to the other phi-features. 
The variable binding approach comes in different variants.2 The presuppositional view (a.o. Heim and 
Kratzer 1998, Schlenker 2003, Büring 2005, Heim 2008a-b) treats first and second person pronouns as 
variables and person features as presupposition triggers just like number or gender features (cf. a.o. Cooper 
1983, Sauerland 2003) as shown in (9): first person pronouns (resp. second person pronouns) presuppose 
that their referent is the speaker (resp. addressee) of the current context.  
 
9) a. [[ mei ]] c,w,g = g(i);  presupposition: g(i)= sc3 
 b. [[ youi ]] c,w,g = g(i);  presupposition: g(i)= ac 
 
Based on this semantics, a multidimensional approach (a.o. Heim 2008a, Sauerland 2013, cf. Jacobson 
2012 in a variable-free framework) attributes the availability of the bound interpretation in (8) to the 
properties of focus constructions: the presuppositional meaning does not have to be satisfied in focus 
alternatives. This derives the bound interpretation in (8) with only and focused I, given that only crucially 
involves a set of focus alternatives C, whether it is considered to be a propositional operator as in (10)a or 
to map an individual to a generalized quantifier as in (10)b.  
 
10) a. [[ only ]] c,w,g = λC. λp. p(w) = 1 ∧ ∀q ∈ C [q(w) ! p ⊆ q] 
b. [[ only ]] c,w,g = λC. λxe. λP<e,t>.{y ∈ C: P(y) = 1} = {x} 
 
This should moreover extend to ellipsis cases, which arguably also involve focus (a.o. Rooth 1992, Heim 
1997, Merchant 2001). The person feature in the ellipsis site in (11) also seems to be left uninterpreted, 
presumably because the identity condition on ellipsis is subject to focus conditions and focus values are 
blind to the presuppositional content of phi-features. 
 
11) a. Johnny did his homework, but I didn’t (do my homework).     (Heim 2008b:45) 
 b. I did my homework, but Johnny didn’t (do his homework). 
 
In sum, presuppositional approaches account for person mismatches in focus and ellipsis constructions 
by positing that the mechanisms that compute focus values and ellipsis resolution may disregard features of 
bound pronouns. 
 
The minimal pronoun approach (a.o. Kratzer 1998, von Stechow 2003, Heim 2008b, Kratzer 2009) 
however assumes that features present at LF are always interpreted, but in constructions involving bound 
readings of pronouns, the variables inherit the phi-features of their antecedent in the morphological 
component only, so that these features are invisible at LF. Specifically, bound first and second person 
pronouns are distinguished from free first and second person pronouns: while the latter are indexicals as in 
(7) or presuppositional as in (9) depending on the specific version of the theory, the former are crucially 
minimal pronouns born featureless, which inherit their morphosyntactic content from their binders due to a 
transmission mechanism operating at PF. Thus bound occurrences of first and second person pronouns are 
in fact semantically third person pronouns (variables depending on the assignment function), but 
morphologically, they look like first and second person pronouns due to Feature Transmission. 
 
12) Feature Transmission: in the derivation of PF, all the phi features of a DP must be copied onto 
pronouns that it binds. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Sudo (2012) for a summary of different arguments for and against these views. 
3 To accommodate plural pronouns, the following presuppositions have been proposed by a.o. Heim (2008b):  
[[ 1st ]] c = λxe: x includes sc. x 
[[ 2nd ]] c = λxe: x includes ac and excludes sc. x 
 
Such minimal pronouns can appear both in focus and ellipsis constructions. 
 
An alternative account is Sudo’s (2012) that unifies the semantics of first, second and third person 
pronouns by encoding the person information in the system of semantic binding: indices are not just 
numbers (with type information), but always carry the person information. On the one hand, this ensures 
that binders and bindees have the same person feature without postulating Feature Transmission; on the 
other hand, this gives rise to bound readings without assuming disappearance of presuppositions in focus 
alternatives. 
 
13) a. [[mei[➀] ]  c,w,g = g(i[➀])     b. [[youi[➁] ]  c,w,g = g(i[➁])  c. [[hei[➂] ]  c,w,g = g(i[➂]) 
 
Moreover both bound and free pronoun readings are derived in the same way, i.e. through the 
assignment function g: g is assumed to be subject to the admissibility condition in (14) that applies at the 
utterance level. 
 
14) Admissibility Condition for Assignment Functions (Sudo 2012: 162) 
An utterance is felicitously evaluated only if the assignment function g satisfies the following conditions:   
a. g(i[➀]) = sc   b. g(i[➁]) = ac    c. g(i[➂]) ≠ sc and g(i[➂]) ≠ ac 
 
Note that bound readings under ellipsis such as (11) are not discussed by Sudo (2012); he simply 
mentions that the judgments of sentences involving VP-ellipsis with a person mismatch are supposed to be 
degraded at least for some speakers. They could be problematic for the theory depending on the status of 
the person information in the identity condition that is assumed for ellipsis. 
 
Crucially, all the variants of the variable binding approach, while explaining examples such as (8), do 
not fare better than the Fixity Thesis for our examples. The Minimal Pronoun approach and Sudo’s (2012) 
crucially rely on the fact that the binder and the bindee share the same person feature; but this is not the 
case for I and you. The presuppositional approach does not impose this constraint, but has the same effect: 
the person mismatch between a binder only I and a bindee you (or vice versa) would be captured as a 
conflict in presuppositions: for binding between I and you to happen in the ordinary meaning, we would 
have to presuppose that there is a unique referent to I and you that is both a speaker and a hearer, which is 
impossible in the same context. Moreover, the predicates involved in our examples are not intended to be 
reflexive (e.g. make oneself swirl in (4)), but we want to have access to pairs of individuals, which is 
impossible under all these variable binding approaches. 
 
3.2 Context shifting approaches 
Context shifting approaches assume mechanisms for shifting indexicals in attitude contexts in some 
languages. Specifically, Schlenker (2003) proposes that attitude verbs are quantifiers over contexts 
(monsters in Kaplan’s terms), and while English indexicals are lexically specified to be evaluated with 
respect to the actual speech act, indexicals in other languages such as Amharic can be evaluated with 
respect to reported speech acts and thus be shifted. Because of the existence of constraints on shiftable 
indexicals (Shift Together, No Intervening Binder), Anand (2006) instead posits context shifting operators, 
which are introduced by some attitude verbs in some languages (not in English). 
As they stand, these two approaches on context shifting do not say anything specific about our data, 
since according to them, the context can only be manipulated in attitude contexts. In fact, they basically 
adopt the presuppositional analysis for bound readings in focus constructions,4 which we saw in the 
previous section cannot capture our data. But it seems that they could correctly predict supersloppy 
readings in ellipsis constructions if we assume that the character (in Kaplan’s terms), which can 
independently be manipulated in their theories,5 can be copied in ellipsis (assuming that there are such 
things as characters of VPs, and not just of propositions). This is illustrated below for sentence (1) where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Both Schlenker (2003: 55) and Anand (2006: 95) explicitly mention that only quantification over individuals, not over 
contexts, is needed in focus constructions. 
5 This is done even more radically in Heim (1991) that assumes abstraction over contexts even in main clauses because 
of examples involving amnesiacs presented in Lewis (1979). 
the character λc.λx.x love ac is copied from the VP antecedent into the ellipsis site: the referent of you thus 
changes from (a) to (b) since the context of speech is different in (a) and (b). 
 
15) a. [cf. (1)a] (Context 1: Romeo to Juliet) “I love you”.     sc1 love ac1  
b. [cf. (1)b] (Context 2: Juliet to Romeo) “I do too”.    sc2 love ac2 
 
But this approach overgenerates: it wrongly predicts the readings in (16) and (17) to be available. 
 
16) a. (Juliet to Romeo) “I love you”.      sc1 love ac1 
  b. (Romeo to Juliet) “Count Pâris does too” (*love you [i.e. Juliet]). Pâris love ac2                               
 
17) a. (Romeo to Juliet) “Count Pâris loves you”.     Pâris love ac1 
b. (Juliet to Romeo) “Rosaline does not” (*love you [i.e. Romeo]).  Rosaline does not love ac2                               
 
Just like in (15), the character VP λc.λx.x love ac has been copied into the ellipsis sites in (16)b and (17)b, 
giving rise to a different referent for you in (16)b as compared to (16)a and in (17)b as compared to (17)a. 
These readings are however impossible and thus show that assuming character copy in ellipsis 
overgenerates. 
 
This is further supported by the c-command requirement: the supersloppy reading is not available in 
(18)b where I does not c-command the elided pronoun you; this is not predicted by an analysis involving 
character copy. 
 
18) a. (Romeo to Juliet) “The man I hate loves you”.  
b. (Juliet to Romeo) “The woman I hate does not” (*love you).                   
 
Furthermore, an extension of this analysis, where characters can be manipulated, to focus constructions 
also overgenerates, albeit in a different way. Just as for ellipsis, it does predict our supersloppy readings 
assuming that only can quantify over contexts as in (19) or that focus alternatives can be evaluated with 
respect to different contexts: basically (20) means that among the relevant alternatives, Tom is the only 
speaker to make his addressee swirl. Note that the fact that dance partners do not necessarily speak is not a 
problem since contexts are taken to apply to any speech or thought situation, not just to the speech act in 
which a sentence is actually produced (Schlenker 2003: 29). 
 
19) Monstrous only (C is a set of pragmatically determined focus alternatives q; K is the set of 
pragmatically relevant contexts c):6  
[[ only ]] c,w,g = λΚ. λC. λc*. λp. p(w)(c*) = 1 ∧ ∀q ∈ C, ∀c ∈ K, [q(w)(c) ! p ⊆ q & c=c*] 
 
20) (Context c*: Tom to Sue, in a ballroom dancing class) Only I make you swirl.           λc. sc make ac swirl 
 ∀c [sc make ac swirl ! c=c*] 
 
This analysis however overgenerates since it predicts that any coordinate of the context can be quantified 
over, contrary to fact. Here in (21) cannot be interpreted in a supersloppy way. 
 
21) (Tom on the phone with friends living in different cities) Only I like it here.                          λc. sc like lc 
*None of Tom’s friends like the city where they live. 
 
Thus clearly, an analysis involving manipulation of the context overgenerates. 
 
Another type of monstrous approach has been proposed by Cable (2005) (and adopted by Kratzer 
2009) to capture standard examples of bound readings of first and second person pronouns such as (8). 
How does it fare in our cases? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In cases where the target proposition does not include any context-dependent element (e.g. Romeo loves Juliet), only 
the actual context should be taken into consideration in the alternatives in order to get the right result. 
Cable’s idea is to introduce special versions of Predicate Abstractions for first and second person 
pronoun binding, which manipulate the coordinates of the context parameter <s, a, w> instead of the 
assignment function g. The following indexical abstraction operators λs and λa are created by movement of 
first and second person pronouns and shift parameters sc and ac respectively; they leave traces ts and ta. 
 
22) a. [[ λs. [XP …ts…]]] <sc, ac, w>, w, g = λx.[[ [XP …ts…] ]] <x, ac, w>, w, g   b. [[  ts ]] <sc, ac, w>, w, g = sc 
c. [[ λa. [XP …ta…]]] <sc, ac, w>, w, g = λx.[[ [XP …ta…]]] <sc, x, w>, w, g   d. [[  ta ]] <sc, ac, w>, w, g = ac 
 
For the cases of free pronoun (strict) readings, movement of first and second person pronouns is 
assumed to create numerical binders λ1 and λ2 and traces t1 and t2 interpreted via g through “priviledged” 
pronominal indices 1 and 2. Otherwise, the semantic values of the pronouns I and you directly depend on 
the context parameter as in (7). 
Here is how the two readings of (8) are derived under Cable’s (2005) account: the crucial parts, i.e. the 
VPs, are derived in (23)a (sloppy reading) and (23)b (strict reading). 
 
23) [=(8)] Only I did my homework.                
a. [[  λs. ts did my homework ]]  <sc,ac,wc>,w,g         
= λx. [[  ts did my homework]]  <x,ac, wc>,w,g 
 = λx. x did x’s homework         
b. [[  λ1. t1 did my homework ]]  <sc,ac,wc>,w,g         
= λx. [[  t1 did my homework]]  < sc,ac, wc>,w,g[1!x] 
 = λx. x did sc’s homework         
 
Crucially, this approach undergenerates in our cases since each indexical abstraction operator only 
manipulates one context coordinate, either the speaker or the addressee. 
 
In sum, all the previous approaches to indexicals fail to predict supersloppy readings because there is 
no specific dependency between the speaker and the addressee built into the system. Either they are simply 
construed as independent individuals via the assignment function, which undergenerates, or they are 
considered as coordinates of the context, which overgenerates since manipulating them together implies 
manipulating the whole context. The key will be to hypothesize a specific dependency between these two 
parameters. 
 
3.3 Complex focus 
Before making this hypothesis, let’s see if such a dependency could not be derived independently, 
specifically from focus, assuming that both pronouns (and not just I) are focused as represented in (24). 
 
24) [=(4)] (Tom to Sue, in a ballroom dancing class) Only IF make youF swirl. 
 
This is an instance of complex focus similar to (25) (Krifka 1991: 21) where two elements are associated 
with the same focus operator:7 what (25) means is that the only pair <x, y> such that John introduced x to y 
is <Bill, Sue>. 
 
25)  John only introduced BillF to SueF.       (Krifka 1991: 21) 
 
This hypothesis makes it possible to similarly have access to pairs of individuals in (24), which could 
be interpreted as saying that the only pair <x, y> such that x makes y swirl is the pair <Tom, Sue>. Note 
that since usual accounts of complex focus do not impose restrictions on the alternative pairs (no specific 
relation between the two members of the pair is grammatically determined), the restriction to a set of dance 
partners in the focus alternatives would have to be done in the pragmatics.  
 
This analysis, albeit possible, is not generally applicable. It could only hold for English speakers who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hedberg (2013) applies this analysis to vice versa clefts of the following kind: 
(i) “Anna: So, what’s the case you’re working on?             [General Hospital, ABC, 6/21/89] 
      Robert: Nothing I need bother you with now. It’s YOU who called ME, remember?” 
put focal stress on both pronouns. But not all speakers report to have to do so in focus constructions, and 
the same prosodic pattern would be highly marked in VP-ellipsis constructions. The availability of the 
supersloppy readings in the absence of complex focus is furthermore confirmed in languages such as 
French that exhibit clitics. 
 
26) Seul  moi  te fais tourner.8 
Only I_CL you_CL make swirl 
“Only I make you swirl.”                           (supersloppy, strict) 
 
In (26), only the subject pronoun I is focused (the strong form moi is used, not the weak form je), the object 
pronoun you is not: that’s why the clitic form te can be used (as opposed to the strong pronominal form toi). 
This means that an analysis involving complex focus cannot explain the facts here. 
 
4. Proposal: dependency speaker/addressee 
 
The review of existing accounts of indexicals in Section 3 reveals that the missing element for explaining 
supersloppy readings is the hypothesis of a dependency between speaker and addressee. This is what I am 
going to propose in this section. 
 
4.1 I and you as e-type pronouns 
It is conceptually attractive to suppose a dependency between I and you given that speaker and addressee of 
the same context are indeed intrinsically related. I propose to build this dependency into the grammar by 
assuming that I and you can be considered as descriptions involving the concept of addressee, i.e. they can 
be e-type pronouns (a.o. Evans 1977, Cooper 1979, Heim 1990, Heim and Kratzer 1998, Elbourne 2001).  
An e-type pronoun is basically a definite description with an unpronounced predicate, which is 
crucially complex: it contains a bound variable and a relational noun whose semantic value depends on the 
utterance context. This is illustrated by a standard example in (27). 
 
27) a. Every host bought just one bottle of wine and served it with the dessert. (Heim & Kratzer 1998: 290) 
 b. [[ it ]] c,w,g = the R7 pro1 
 
Here it can be interpreted as in (27)b where the free R variable receives a denotation from the context, i.e. 
the relation that holds between people and bottles they have bought (λx.λy.y is a bottle that x bought), and 
the variable pro1 (argument of R) is bound by every host. 
 
I hypothesize that I and you can be construed in a similar way except that the semantic value of the 
silent predicate is fixed lexically instead of depending on the utterance context,9 i.e. it denotes the 
“addressee” function A defined in (28)a that ranges over context participants s (speaker) and a (addressee) 
only; the idempotence of function A reflects the reciprocity of the relation between s and a. 
 
28) a. A = {<s, a>, <a, s>} 
 b. [[ you ]] c,w,g = [[ A(s) ]] c,w,g = a you: “my addressee” 
 c. [[ I ]] c,w,g = [[ A(a) ]] c,w,g = s  I: “your addressee” 
 
Once this assumption is made, we can derive supersloppy readings as long as we can derive the bound 
reading of first and second person pronouns since roughly speaking, my (resp. your) contained in the 
description my addressee (resp. your addressee) will end up being bound by the antecedent I (resp. you); 
furthermore, we observe that supersloppy readings crucially arise in the same contexts as bound readings of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 There is speaker variation in word order (e.g. both moi seul te fais tourner and je suis le seul à te faire tourner are also 
acceptable), but in all cases “you” is crucially a clitic (te). 
9 Interestingly, this could explain why regular e-type construals do not seem to be available for first and second person 
pronouns as illustrated by (ii) uttered in a context where the speaker is Michael’s spouse: 
(ii) *This year everyone was supposed to bring their spouse, but only MICHAEL brought me.         (Jacobson 2012: 34) 
We can assume that the e-type construal involving the lexically available function “addressee” blocks any other 
construal based on pragmatically available functions. 
first and second person pronouns (namely VP-ellipsis and focus constructions), so that it is reasonable to 
assume that supersloppy readings are a specific kind of bound readings. Not any analysis of bound 
indexicals will do though: analyses such as Kratzer (2009)’s or Sudo (2012)’s that crucially rely on the 
sharing of features between binder and bindee are not compatible with my e-type hypothesis. For 
convenience, I implement my proposal in Cable’s (2005) framework below, but note that a 
presuppositional and multidimensional approach could also be used (see footnote 11).  
 
4.2 Derivation of supersloppy readings 
Under Cable’s (2005) framework, the derivations of supersloppy readings go as in (23) except that the 
pronoun intended to be bound (you by I, or me by you) is construed as an e-type pronoun as in (28). This is 
illustrated below for focus constructions (4) and (5). 
 
29)  a. [=(4)] (Tom to Sue, in a ballroom dancing class) Only IF make you swirl. 
b.   [[ (4)]] <T,S,wc>,w,g = [[ only I λs. ts make you swirl]] <T,S,wc>,w,g 
   = only’ ([[  I ]]  <T,S, wc>,w,g) (λx. [[  ts make A(s) swirl]]  <x,S, wc>,w,g ) 
           = only’ (Tom) (λx. x make A(x) swirl) 
 
30) a. [=(5)] (Sue to Tom, in a ballroom dancing class) Only youF didn’t make me fall over. 
b.   [[ (5)]] <S,T,wc>,w,g = [[ only you λa. ta didn’t make me fall over]] <S,T,wc>,w,g 
        = only’ (([[  you ]]  <S,T, wc>,w,g) (λx. [[  ta didn’t make A(a) fall over]]  <S,x, wc>,w,g ) 
                              = only’ (Tom) (λx. x didn’t make A(x) fall over) 
 
The VP-ellipsis cases are derived in a similar way. (31)c shows the derivation of the VP in (1)a that 
should be copied into the ellipsis site in (1)b to obtain a supersloppy reading. 
 
31) a. [=(1)a]  (Romeo to Juliet) “I love you”.  
  b. [=(1)b] (Juliet to Romeo) “I do too”. 
c. [[ VP- (1)a]] <R,J,wc>,w,g = [[ λs. ts love A(s)]] <R,J,wc>,w,g  
   = λx. [[ ts love A(s)]] <x,J,wc>,w,g  
   = λx. x love A(x) 
 
Note that we have two options here: either we assume copy of the property λx. x love A(x) into the ellipsis 
site, or copy of the string λs. ts love A(s). I explain the advantages and drawbacks of each option below. 
The first option (copy of λx. x love A(x)) amounts to semantic copy, which seems most plausible in 
view of recent approaches on ellipsis. In that case, the supersloppy reading in (16) repeated in (32) as well 
as the reading shown in (33) are correctly ruled out because the function A only ranges over discourse 
participants, and Count Pâris is neither a speaker nor an addressee in contexts (b) (where Romeo and Juliet 
are the discourse participants), so it cannot bind the elided e-type pronoun A(x). 
 
32) [=(16)] a. (Juliet to Romeo) “I love you”. b. (Romeo to Juliet) “Count Pâris does too” (*love you) 
33) a. (Juliet to Romeo) “I love you”. b. (Romeo to Juliet) “Count Pâris does too” (*love his addressee)                       
 
(17) is even more easily ruled out since an indexical abstraction operator cannot be created in the first place 
in the antecedent where the intended binder (Count Pâris) is neither a speaker nor an addressee. 
 
34) [=(17)] a. (Romeo to Juliet) “Count Pâris loves you”.   
 b. (Juliet to Romeo) “Rosaline does not” (*love you [i.e. Romeo]).   
 
Further note that this hypothesis implies that quantification over context is available with only in (29) 
and (30) (as in 19): because of the range restriction of A, all the subjects in the alternatives must refer to 
discourse participants. Also, this predicts that speaker and addressee are interchangeable in the focus 
alternatives, as well as in ellipsis constructions: in other words, the supersloppy reading in (35) below is 
predicted to be available since λx. x see A(x) can be copied from the matrix clause to the ellipsis site in the 
subordinate clause and you belongs to the domain of the function A. The actual judgment of (35) is 
questionable. 
35) (Sam to Lynn) I saw you before you did (?see me).          (supersloppy) 
 
The second option (copy of  λs. ts love A(s)) would amount to syntactic copy (note that Cable (2005) 
distinguishes between the semantic parameter s and the syntactic index s), which could independently be 
problematic in view of vehicle change issues. The advantage is that this would allow us to give up the 
domain restriction of A to discourse participants10 since the relevant readings would not need this 
requirement any more to be ruled out. Thus (16) is simply ruled out because the binder λs that would be 
copied into the ellipsis site is incompatible with the third person Count Pâris. This would also let us return 
to a more classic version of only without quantification over contexts. Moreover, (35) would be ruled out 
unless it is analyzed with complex focus on I and you (maybe a good result given the intermediate status of 
the judgment). 
 
However, note that one problem with Cable’s (2005) approach has been pointed out by Kratzer (2009) 
and Sudo (2012): it undergenerates because it wrongly precludes mixed readings in sentences involving 
several indexicals like (36); under his approach, either all indexicals are bound or none of them. 	  
36) Only I believe that my advisor read my dissertation.     (Sudo 2012: 160) 
  (4 readings: Nobody else believes that my/his advisor read my/his dissertation) 
 
This however could seem to turn out to be an advantage for our cases, since they disallow mixed readings. 
 
37) a. (Martha to Emily) “I think that my advisor read your dissertation.” 
b. (Emily to Martha) “I do too.”   i. [think that my advisor read your dissertation]          (supersloppy) 
                    ii. [think that your advisor read my dissertation]      (strict) 
                    iii. * [think that your advisor read your dissertation]    (mixed) 
                    iv. * [think that my advisor read my dissertation]     (mixed) 
 
This conclusion is nevertheless dubious under closer scrutiny since the optionality of our e-type construal 
should in fact license mixed readings in sentences like (37) (esp. reading (iv) where the indexical 
abstraction operator λs is created by movement of I and binds my, but does not bind you when it is not 
construed as an e-type pronoun). Mixed readings thus turn out to be a bigger problem for Cable’s (2005) 
approach since it undergenerates regular bound readings and overgenerates supersloppy readings. For my 
cases, this means that another approach on bound readings of first and second person pronouns should 
ultimately be adopted, but we have seen that all of them face problems; for space reasons, I leave for 
further occasion the precise examination of how the presuppositional and multidimensional approach 
would fare when combined with my e-type proposal.11 The behavior of time and location indexicals (e.g. 
now, here) will also be examined in future work.12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This would potentially allow us to postulate less restricted functions such as “lover” or “dance partner” instead of A 
to construct our e-type pronouns, which has the advantage of predicting the right focus alternatives more easily (no 
need to postulate that dance partners are discourse participants). But this implies that such functions are not lexically, 
but pragmatically available, and thus predicts the phenomenon to be much more general. A supersloppy reading is for 
instance predicted to arise in (iii), which is dubious (or at least requires a much richer context than (1)). 
(iii) Juliet loves Romeo. Romeo does too [?love his lover, i.e. Juliet]. 
11 Basically it compares with the first option presented above based on Cable’s (2005) approach in terms of predictions: 
postulating a function A only ranging over discourse participants is necessary to make the right predictions in ellipsis. 
However, a presuppositional and multidimensional approach fares better for mixed readings in regular cases like (36), 
which are correctly predicted to be available; but it also predicts mixed readings to be available in supersloppy cases 
like (37) contrary to fact it seems. Furthermore, this approach may appear more attractive than Cable’s conceptually as 
it derives the availability of bound readings of indexicals in specific cases (focus constructions and VP-ellipsis) from 
the specificity of these constructions (focus), and does not introduce a new mechanism of abstraction into the system. 
However, it remains to explain in detail how the focus meaning can be blind to the presuppositional content of phi-
features, but not to other presuppositions (which would make many wrong predictions in only constructions). 
12 One issue is that there seems to be a contrast between focus constructions and VP-ellipsis involving here. Thus the 
supersloppy reading in (iv) appears to be more easily available than in (21): 
(iv) (Tom on the phone with a friend living in a different city) “I like it here.” (Tom’s friend to Tom) “I do too.” 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have provided novel English data in VP-ellipsis and focus constructions showing that first 
and second person pronouns cannot only be bound like third person pronouns as previously observed, they 
can also be bound by each other. This further demonstrates contra the Kaplanian thesis that indexicals are 
not simply constants referring to the actual context of speech. More innovatively, this reveals a 
grammatical dependency between speaker and addressee, which are standardly considered as two 
independent context parameters. 
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Time indexicals are harder to test since it is trickier to construct scenarios with different context times that would 
license VP-ellipsis constructions. It is not clear whether difference in time zones could be used, as the time is in fact the 
same for two speakers talking on the phone from different time zones: only their clock is different (Heim, p.c.). 
